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The use of ‘think aloud’ technique, information
processing theory and schema theory to
explain decision-making processes of general
practitioners and nurse practitioners using
patient scenarios
Maxine Offredy Faculty of Health and Human Sciences, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK and Elizabeth
Meerabeau School of Health University of Greenwich, Eltham, UK
This paper focuses on one aspect of a research study exploring the cognitive proc-
esses of decision making by 11 nurse practitioners and 11 general practitioners from
the south east of England, using six patient scenarios during 2000. It sets out to
explain some of their decision-making processes. This paper is part of a larger study
discussing the use of information processing theory as a framework for exploring
decision-making. Schema theory is used to provide explanation of correct and incor-
rect responses to the six scenarios. The paper explores areas in which cognitive
overlap occurs and uses the participants’ examples to illustrate schema functioning.
The usefulness of information processing theory to explore decision-making by
nurse practitioners is also addressed. The paper concludes by suggesting that infor-
mation processing theory and ‘think aloud’ approaches were suitable for identifying
errors in decision-making, and could therefore be used as a teaching tool. Change is
required in the culture of primary care organizations if shifting emphasis towards
developing collective responsibility and greater openness is to be achieved.
Key words: cognitive processes; decision-making; information processing theory;
nurse practitioners; schema theory
Introduction
The ‘think aloud’ approach to the study of
decision-making was developed from information
processing theory (Newell and Simon, 1972) and
requires participants to think aloud as they solve
either real or hypothetical problems. Schema
theory describes the construction of mental mod-
els for problem-solving. This method was chosen
for this study as the process allows researchers to
gain an understanding of the ‘paradox of expert-
ise’ (Johnson, 1983), by analysing the transcripts
of the tape-recorded verbalizations. Johnson
(1983) explained that while it is important to
know how experts think so that others may be
helped to think in a similar way, experts are usu-
ally unable to provide detailed descriptions of
how they perform tasks.
The discussions in this paper form part of a
larger qualitative study, conducted in 2000, which
explored decision-making consultations in primary
health care by nurse practitioners and general prac-
titioners for diagnosis and treatment when given
the same patient scenarios. This paper provides
explanation of the decision-making processes of the
two groups of participants. Schema theory is used
as the basis for the explanation, whilst the useful-
ness of information processing theory as a frame-
work for exploring decision-making is examined.
The paper begins by briefly outlining the aims and
methods of the larger study, thereby contextualiz-
ing the discussion of this article. It then introduces
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schema theory before explaining the reasons for
correct and incorrect responses to the scenarios
summarized in Table 1.
The study
Aim
The aim of the larger study was to ascertain
the differences, if any, in the decision-making
processes of nurse practitioners (NPs) and general
practitioners (GPs) for diagnosis and treatment
when given the same patient scenarios. This paper
provides an explanation of the decision-making
processes of the two groups.
Methods
A summary of study procedures will be pro-
vided here as full details of this have been
reported elsewhere (Offredy, 2002). Twenty-two
participants, 11 NPs and 11 GPs, from the south
east of England, chosen by purposeful sampling
took part in the main study following the pilot.
The two inclusion criteria for the NPs were that:
a) they had to be qualified nurse practitioners
who had undertaken the Royal College of Nursing
(RCN) nurse practitioner degree programme; and
b) their current employment had to be as a nurse
practitioner in a primary care setting working
alongside a GP. The single inclusion criterion for
the GPs was employment of a nurse practitioner
(as a nurse practitioner) as part of the health care
team. Six scenarios were used for study. The
presenting situations were: a rash, an unhealed
wound to the cheek, back pain, persistent cough,
vaginal discharge and a request to register as a
new patient with the surgery. The correct diag-
noses for these situations were respectively
shingles, cigarette burn to the cheek, lower back
pain, chest infection, pelvic inflammatory disease
and hypertension. These scenarios were chosen
because their prevalence in general practice
ranged from 9% (circulatory diseases) to 31%
(respiratory diseases) (McCormick et al., 1995).
Two NPs and a GP who were not involved in the
study were given the task of choosing the scenar-
ios. A reference model, devised for each scenario,
indicated critical and relevant cues. Critical cues
were necessary for successful diagnosis of the
condition and relevant cues provided potentially
important information for reaching an accurate
diagnosis (Joseph and Patel, 1990; Offredy, 2002).
Each reference model described the signs, symp-
toms, type of examination or procedure that
might be undertaken, as well as the treatment or
range of possible options that could be decided.
Written information about the research was
posted to each participant two weeks prior to the
interview. The conditions in the scenarios were
not disclosed in the participants’ letter. However,
explanation was provided about the research
question, the aims of the research, the ‘think
aloud’ procedure and that the scenarios used
would be usual in general practice. The letter also
explained that ethical approval had been obtained
for the research and that the identity of the prac-
titioners would be anonymized in the report.
Each participant was interviewed individually, in
his or her consulting room at the general practice.
At the time of the interview, a reminder of the
aims of the research was given, as well as further
explanation on the ‘think aloud’ procedure. A
different scenario was used with the participants
as a ‘test run’ to familiarize them with the
procedure.
Protocol analysis
The data generated by the 22 participants, each
providing verbalizations on six scenarios, were sub-
stantial (N ¼ 132 transcripts). Participants were
given a number to protect their identity. The inter-
views were transcribed verbatim. Computer soft-
ware, QSR NUDIST (1997), was used for data
management.
Two types of decisions were observed in the
transcripts; one was concerned with the cognitive
processes of diagnostic decision-making and the
other was therapeutic decision-making or treat-
ment. Coding reflected these two separate types
of decision-making. For the cognitive mode of
decision-making (diagnosis), Elstein et al.’s (1978)
four stages of the reasoning process were used,
namely: 1) cue acquisition; 2) hypothesis gener-
ation; 3) cue interpretation; and 4) hypothesis
evaluation. Additional codes were required for
the second type of decision-making (therapeutic
decisions) and were developed from the analysis
of the pilot. The additional codes were 5) diag-
nosis; 6) treatment; 7) advice; 8) further treat-
ment=advice=refer to outside agency; and 9) refer
to GP. Thus, nine stages compose the decision-
making of the participants. Each of the nine
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stages was further subdivided to provide more
explanation about the cognitive processes and the
decisions made by the participants to conclude
the exercise. The following section outlines a brief
review of schema theory before providing an
explanation of responses to the scenarios.
Schema theory
The word ‘schema’ originated from the Greek
language meaning ‘form’, ‘shape’ or ‘figure’. In
modern psychological usage schema draws upon
the individual’s application of knowledge, found
in memory, to make sense of experience in their
world. The mid-1970s witnessed a resurgence of
schema theory by Minsky (1975), Schank (1975)
and Rumelhart (1975). Each of these authors pro-
vided their own perspective on the use of schema
theory with Minsky (1975) proposing that knowl-
edge in human memory can be structured into
frames. A frame represents a data-structure of a
stereotypical situation, for example, attending
one’s general practitioner. Attached to each
frame are different types of information, which
guide behaviour as to what may happen next, or
what to do if these expectations do not occur.
Minsky (1975) likened frames to a network of
nodes and relations. Collections of frames are
linked together into frame-systems. In turn, the
frame-systems are interconnected in an infor-
mation retrieval network. When a situation is
represented by a frame, a matching process takes
place. This is similar to Newell and Simon’s
(1972) view that knowledge is structured and
stored in interrelated chunks in memories of
different types and capacities.
Schank (1975) agreed with much of what
Minsky (1975) said about frames, and developed the
frames idea to lend itself to applications in daily
life. Instead of using the word ‘frames’, Schank
(1975) used the concept of scripts to address
discourse and comprehension. A script is a pre-
determined, stereotyped sequence of actions that
define a well-known situation. Scripts organize
new inputs in terms of previously stored knowl-
edge (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Scripts also
describe social events that share common
structures between individuals. This implies that
individuals can discuss an event because of their
similar understanding of that script. Greenwood
(2000) suggested that scripts are similar to
action schemata because they represent what is
to be done. She stated that:
scripts are the means whereby an agent’s
overall intention is translated into hierarchi-
cally organised instructional units which
reflect the structure of the movements
required and which eventually issue in
action.
Greenwood, 2000: 432.
Rumelhart (1975) retained the word schema in his
work on representations in memory. He argued
that schemata are structures for organizing data;
the implication being that individuals are able to
make sense of their world by the structures they
create, otherwise each piece of information would
be regarded as new and uncategorized. Catego-
rization is a necessity for intelligent action.
Marshall (1995) explained that four types of
knowledge are included in schema theory. These
are: 1) identification knowledge; 2) elaboration
knowledge; 3) planning knowledge; and 4)
execution knowledge. Identification knowledge
allows recognition of an issue; its key task is pat-
tern recognition. Pattern recognition happens as a
result of the many cognitive processes occurring
together; no single stimulus acts as a trigger to
the recognition. Each schema has its own distinct
identification knowledge, although schemata may
share some commonalities. Elaboration knowl-
edge contains details about the key elements of
the event or situation causing a schema to be
developed. In other words, this type of knowledge
draws on specific examples from the individual’s
experience and explanations may be offered relat-
ing to the incident. Elaboration knowledge also
helps the individual to create a mental picture of
the current situation. When the general situation
has been recognized by identification knowledge,
information about the current experience will be
accessed from a ‘template’ about the situation.
Understanding of the current issue depends on
how well or badly it fits the schema template.
Identification and elaboration knowledge make
up a network that allows the individual to
construct a working hypothesis about the situ-
ation at hand and then to retest it. Planning
knowledge refers to the ability to use the schema
to be creative, make plans and establish goals and
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subgoals when confronted with situations. This
ability is derived from experience. It is possible
for individuals to have identification and elabor-
ation knowledge but have no planning knowl-
edge. Thus, they would not have a working
schema. The possession of execution knowledge
permits the individual to carry out plans. In sum-
mary, schemata are data patterns for representing
generic concepts stored in memory. They are net-
works of interrelations that are believed to hold
the attributes of the concept that is being dis-
cussed. Attributes will vary according to the con-
cept under discussion. It is this variability that
gives schema its flexibility to recognize patterns
since schemata may exist at different levels of
abstraction and complexity. A limitation of sche-
mata is that they fail to address precisely how
their components interact.
In their own way the work of Minsky (1975),
Schank (1975), Rumelhart (1975) and Marshall
(1995) describes the construction of mental mod-
els for problem-solving. Constructing a mental
model involves recognition of a problem, forming
a mental image of it, transforming an initially
vague strategy into a structured one, and finally
using the strategy to plan and execute a solution.
Table 1 summarizes the scenarios used in the
study and the responses provided by the GPs and
NPs. The following provides a discussion of the
differences found in the findings of the scenarios.
These are classified under two headings: correct
and incorrect responses to the scenarios.
Explanation of correct responses to the
scenarios
According to Marshall’s (1995) theory, the study
participants were able to identify a situation,
event or experience where similar patterns of cues
were encountered. Patterns can be visual, audi-
tory or olfactory. They may be acquired through
didactic instruction or clinical experience and will
range from simple to complex, with concomitant
configuration of features. Patterns or cues can
also be referred to as forceful features. Gale and
Marsden (1985) suggested that forceful features
are:
keys to memory, providing the mechanism
for gaining access to the information stored
there. What acts as a forceful feature
depends on the way the person has organ-
ised his=her knowledge in the memory store.
Gale and Marsden, 1985: 69
For example, analysis of the chest infection scen-
ario indicated that relevant information might be
stored in the clinician’s memory, but if it is not
organized in a way that is accessible via forceful
features that are clinically relevant, it will not be
of use when appropriate. Gale and Marsden
(1985) maintained that a forceful feature can be
made up of any number of pieces of information
and may be the ‘key’ of several memory struc-
tures. The skill lies in fitting the forceful feature=s
to the appropriate memory structure=s (Figure 1).
Figure 1 demonstrates how forceful features
direct the study participants to make new inter-
pretations in the light of new information. When
the participants were presented with the scenario
of a patient complaining of vaginal discharge, this
suggested a normal state. When presented with
further information they used the original infor-
mation and the new data (or cues) to make a dif-
ferent interpretation of vaginal thrush. The same
information was reinterpreted in the light of new
information (that is, after examination of the
patient) to give a diagnosis of pelvic inflamma-
tory disease. Two forms of reinterpretation can
be seen: first, reinterpretation of the same infor-
mation by associating it with different memory
structures; and second, reinterpretation of
additional information (after patient examin-
ation) which gives new forceful features or cues
Figure 1 Clinical information and associated memory
structures
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which link to different memory structures so that
a new interpretation is made. This iterative pro-
cess of transforming an initially vague or incom-
plete schema into one that is well specified is
an essential part of problem-solving. Each of
Marshall’s (1995) four types of knowledge is used
to illustrate the participants’ responses.
1) Identification knowledge: The cues elicited
from the six scenarios where responses were
correct triggered many forceful features in the
cognitive processes of the practitioners to
activate identification knowledge schemata.
These forceful features are interconnected ele-
ments that form structural representations
and are essential for schema knowledge. The
degree of connectivity varies in strength and
type. Connections may be excitatory or
inhibitory (Marshall, 1995). Analysis of the
‘think aloud’ process revealed that in some
scenarios, for example scenarios 1 (shingles),
4 (lower back pain), 5 (pelvic inflammatory
disease) and 6 (hypertension), participants
utilized specific cues to arrive at a judgement.
It could be argued that at this juncture excit-
atory connections might have triggered some
features of elaboration knowledge to enable
the participants to build upon their existing
schema template. Crucially, the individual
must possess sufficient knowledge in order to
assess whether the current information being
received fits with the previous schema tem-
plate. Perhaps it is at this stage that differ-
ences in the knowledge base of the two
groups would reveal themselves since doctors
have a broader knowledge base than NPs.
Both groups are taught to make differential
diagnoses. The differential diagnoses include
the most probable or common conditions, as
well as the least common conditions that may
have adverse consequences if there is a delay
in diagnosis. Doctors may have a wider range
of differential diagnoses than NPs given
their experience and the difference in their
education and training, particularly in
decision-making.
2) Elaboration knowledge: The ‘think aloud’
transcripts revealed that not all participants
engaged in elaboration knowledge. An
experienced practitioner might appear to
bypass this process. It would seem that as
individuals learn a skill, the repetitious use of
the skill requires less effort; it becomes auto-
matic (Baron, 1994). Baron (1994) conceded
that automatization is not fully understood
and was of the view that it may be a conse-
quence of doing things more quickly so that
various demands of the problem can be
undertaken in quick succession, or, as prac-
tice increases less attention is required to per-
form the task. Mental patterns gained from
experience and fitted in a cohesive and con-
nective way are referred to as analogical
reasoning. Analogies are useful in problem-
solving if the practitioner is able to con-
ceptualize which elements of the new problem
correspond to elements of the old one. Thus,
elaboration knowledge is important in
analogical reasoning. As cue acquisition
increases, the probability of each hypoth-
esis=diagnosis is re-evaluated in the light of
the new information  this is a form of
hypothetico-deductive reasoning.1 As novices
gain experience, they become more adept at
identifying solutions to analogous problems,
which may be applicable in new situations
(Parrino and Mitchell, 1989).
Shanteau’s (1992) study on the amount and
quality of data collected by doctors can be
applied to NPs. The study showed that experi-
enced doctors have the ability to distinguish
between relevant and non-relevant data and
that unnecessary data can be confusing,
unhelpful or are sometimes dangerous. An
earlier study by Norman and Tugwell (1982)
found that thoroughness of cue acquisition
was uncorrelated with attaining the correct
diagnosis. Identification and elaboration
knowledge form the network that enables the
practitioners to make and evaluate their
hypotheses. At this stage the practitioners are
making a judgement  that the condition
1A scientific hypothesis is a proposed explanation of some
natural phenomenon. This hypothesis can be tested because it
must make specific predictions which would be the logical
consequence of the hypothesis and the experiment if the
hypothesis is indeed an accurate description of how nature
works. This manner of testing, in which the hypothesis serves
as the assumption and predictions as conclusions is known as
the hypothesis-deductive method and is associated with the
work of Karl Popper (19021994).
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resembles one of shingles, chest infection,
lower back pain or pelvic inflammatory dis-
ease. Thus for problem-solving, an important
heuristic method is to retrieve from memory a
problem in the same domain and to try to
relate those cues to the ones of the present
problem. In other words, identification
knowledge (retrieval from memory) is as
important as elaboration knowledge (schema
construction). Having made the judgement,
the next step is to make a plan of what to do.
3) Planning knowledge: Planning knowledge can
be seen as mental flow diagrams indicating
what action to take when evaluating a parti-
cular complaint or finding, as in scenarios 2
(chest infection) and 6 (hypertension). Elab-
oration and planning knowledge require the
practitioner to think through the situation
and, depending on the data gathered, the
mental flow diagram can be constructed from
repeated use of established practice protocols
or national guidelines. For example, some
general practice protocols suggested that in
some circumstances antibiotics may be given
pending confirmation of laboratory results.
Such decisions are exemplified in scenarios 2
(chest infection) and 5 (pelvic inflammatory
disease) where quick recognition of a pattern
and its concomitant response is recom-
mended. The response to these conditions
becomes automatic and the time lag between
diagnosis of the condition and commence-
ment of therapy is decreased.
4) Execution knowledge: In the case of scenario
6 (hypertension) several readings would be
taken over a specified period before a
diagnosis of hypertension would be made.
This procedure  a type of algorithm  is in
line with British national guidelines (Ramsay
et al., 1999). With the exception of two NPs,
no medication would be given to the patient
at their first visit. This, again, is in line with
national guidelines. Practitioners can be
aware of what to do, but because of, for
example, organizational and legal constraints,
they were unable to engage in execution
knowledge. This was exemplified by NPs 2, 6,
9 and 10 where the NPs referred to the GP
because the decision on the treatment of the
presenting problem was outside their role
(organizational constraint), to confirm the
diagnosis, or to obtain a signed prescription
(legal constraint). In other words, in the four
general practices (P2, 6, 9 and 10) the
decision of how to manage and treat the
patient rested with the GPs. In scenario 1
(shingles), 10 of the 11 NPs were able to dis-
cuss their decision of how and why they
would treat the patient. In other words, the
NPs were utilizing execution knowledge.
However, where NPs were unable to recog-
nize salient data they may have had incorrect
responses, which are discussed below.
Explanation of incorrect responses
to the scenarios
When an NP does not instantly recognize a prob-
lem, the NP will seek to establish further facts
about the case, while at the same time holding
one or more hypotheses in mind. This knowledge
is akin to elaboration knowledge, where the focus
of attention of the NP is on the list of competing
diagnoses that has been brought about during the
clinical encounter. The stored details in identifi-
cation knowledge act as the recognition require-
ment so that the practitioner can assess whether
his=her schema fits the problem. In some cases,
the identification knowledge schema may not be a
perfect fit for the problem at hand, because cru-
cial elements of the problem are missing from the
schema. The elaboration knowledge provides the
shape of the mental model, showing its key char-
acteristics. These key characteristics are derived
from the problem. It could be at this point where
connections may be inhibited. Marshall (1995: 55)
explained that a function of a schema is to pro-
vide ‘where reasonable and appropriate the default
characteristics that allow the schema to be used’
(Marshall’s emphasis). Inaccuracies may arise
here as the missing crucial elements are replaced
by too many default characteristics. The prac-
titioner may choose to collect more data, scan for
other possible schemata or proceed with the cur-
rent schema in the knowledge that its fit is prob-
lematic. This latter point may account for the
inaccurate diagnosis of scenario 3 (cigarette burn
to cheek  nonaccidental injury) where the
majority of practitioners indicated that the
condition was one of impetigo, although its
resemblance was not ‘classic impetigo’ (GPs and
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NPs in scenario 3). The assumption is that practi-
tioners reverted to the use of heuristics and in
particular availability heuristics. There are sim-
ilarities with availability heuristics and schema
theory in that relational characteristics play a
part in the diagnostic processes of both the for-
mer and the latter. Differences, however, can be
seen in the analysis of verbal protocols, where the
ability to isolate relevant from irrelevant material
and to make more inferences from relevant
material were more readily established, than with
the use of schema theory. Kahneman et al. (1982)
warned against the use of heuristics as a reliable
tool for decision-making, particularly as they may
bias the practitioner and interfere with the diag-
nostic process. This is most likely to occur when
the practitioner’s judgement is adversely affected
by the heuristics of:
. availability (diagnosing from recent case
experience, for example GP2 in scenario 5 (pel-
vic inflammatory disease)
. representativeness (selecting a diagnosis
because of surface resemblance, for example,
the majority of practitioners in scenario 3 (non-
accidental injury), and
. anchoring (retaining an early hypothesis
(vaginal thrush) despite the provision of new
data, for example NP11 in scenario 5 (pelvic
inflammatory disease).
Further explanation of an incorrect response is
provided using NP11’s ‘think aloud’ response
to scenario 5 (pelvic inflammatory disease)
(Figure 2). Incorrect diagnosis could be due to
the NP’s inability to access the accurate identifi-
cation knowledge schema. It is postulated that
the NP may not have been previously exposed to
the condition and therefore the appropriate
schema was not present or activated. In other
words, there was no pattern recognition because
there was no experiential knowledge on which to
draw. It would appear that the NP was unable to
create the appropriate mental model of the cur-
rent problem from her elaboration knowledge,
resulting in uncertainty in interpreting the cues
presented. A possible explanation for this is the
presence of too many default characteristics.
Schema theory suggests that when someone
incorporates new knowledge into their thinking
 depending on how the information is presented
 the individual may be able to either (i) work
out the general properties of the concept from the
specific information provided, or (ii) generate
their own example to illustrate the concept from
the abstract or basic characteristics of the infor-
mation given. Marshall (1995) stated that in prac-
tice both types of information are usually
provided. Thus, schema development is depen-
dent upon the type of information given: strong
schemata are more likely to be developed when
the new information is presented with an example
or a definition of a concept.
Gale and Marsden (1985) pointed out that
diagnostic errors may be due to one or more of
the following: i) inadequate memory structure,
Figure 2 Scenario 5: Pelvic inflammatory disease.
Decision-making processes for NP11
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ii) inappropriate or inaccessible memory structure,
iii) failure to use an appropriate range of thinking
processes, and iv) holding on to an incorrect
interpretation. Diagnostic performance may be
attributed to differences in memory structure and
their accessibility rather than only the process of
thinking. Gale and Marsden (1985) suggested that
differences in ‘expertise’ might be due to how
knowledge and experience are structured and
stored in the memory and how they become
accessible and usable.
Schema debates
Although explanation of cognitive processes is
divided into four types of knowledge, overlap
occurs. The areas in which overlap occurs give
rise to two on-going debates.
Conscious versus automatic occurrence of
schema
There is a debate as to whether the individual
can consciously and deliberately invoke a schema
or whether their use occurs automatically. The
answer depends on the presenting problem. If the
problem is unfamiliar to the practitioner, identifi-
cation of the problem implies a conscious and
controlled attempt to solve it. Unfamiliar features
of a problem will require conscious and deliberate
action on the part of the individual. Reason
(1990) suggested that when individuals are con-
fronted with a problem, the tendency is to search
for a well-tried solution at the rule-based level.
That is, the rule is selected from previous success-
ful experiences of problem solving before search-
ing the knowledge-based level (slow, sequential
conscious processing), even when the latter is the
appropriate route to explore. When individuals
persist with incomplete knowledge for problem-
solving they tend to match characteristics of the
problem to stored problem handling rules: IF
(situation) ! THEN (action) (Newell and Simon,
1972; Reason, 1990). When repeated failure of
rule-based reasoning occurs, the practitioner will
move to the knowledge-based level of decision-
making. Reason (1990) commented that even at
this stage the problem-solver will try to find cues
that are reminiscent of previously successful rules
that could be modified to integrate elements of
the problem at hand.
Simultaneous versus sequential schema
functioning
The second area of debate is whether schema
functioning is simultaneous processing or whether
processing occurs sequentially. Marshall (1995)
stated that both types of processing are involved
in schema production. She explained that simul-
taneous processing occurs in the recognition of a
problem and sequential processing occurs when
utilizing planning and execution knowledge. Sim-
ultaneous processing refers to networks of small
highly related pieces of information that are proc-
essed at the same time. The presence or absence
of a set of features, together with the ways in
which they are linked, determines the recognition
of a situation or problem. An example of this is
scenario 3 (cigarette burn to cheek, nonaccidental
injury). Practitioners developed their own set and
subset of features of the condition, which allowed
quick recognition of the problem. This was ascer-
tained when the practitioners were asked to
explain their reasons for their decisions. Their
explanations confirmed elaboration, planning and
execution knowledge.
Sequential processing was evident in the ver-
bal protocols of both practitioners in each of
the six scenarios. Most pairs of practitioners
indicated that they would provide the same
treatment=management of the situation, which
suggested similarity in the organization and
integration of instructional information stored
in memory. Their cognitive mechanisms allowed
them to map systematic relational structures
from one situation to the next. An interpret-
ation of the findings is that the two groups of
experienced practitioners have developed knowl-
edge in the form of ‘disease scripts’ containing
prototypical information about diseases. This is
similar to Feltovich and Barrows’ (1984) con-
cept of ‘illness scripts’ which the authors
described as stereotypical sequential schemata
with three main components: i) enabling con-
ditions, ii) faults, and iii) consequences.
‘Enabling conditions’ are predisposing factors to
the presenting problem and include demo-
graphic characteristics such as age, sex, occu-
pation, ethnicity and social class. ‘Faults’ are
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disorders of the presenting problem such as
organ failure, trauma and infection. ‘Con-
sequences’ are the signs and symptoms linked
to a particular disorder of the presenting prob-
lem. Evidence of the use of enabling conditions
in this study was seen, for example, in scenario
1 where ‘enabling conditions’ (together with the
photograph of the condition) were presented to
the NPs and GPs. With only this background
information, the more experienced practitioners
(those with more than two years’ NP experi-
ence) were more quickly able to arrive at an
accurate diagnosis and treatment=management
options than was the less experienced prac-
titioner (NP11, eight months’ NP experience).
This suggests that the experienced practitioners
in making their judgements used only infor-
mation relating to ‘enabling conditions’ as
opposed to using all three components of an
‘illness script’. Scenario 3 is another example of
using only ‘enabling conditions’ information to
arrive at an accurate diagnosis. Fewer practi-
tioners were able to arrive at a correct diag-
nosis for this scenario than for scenario 1.
The findings of scenarios 1 (shingles) and 2
(chest infection) showed that cue activation for
these ‘disease scripts’ led quickly to accurate diag-
noses and treatment=management decisions. The
proposed explanation is that the prototypical
knowledge structure in memory, based on experi-
ence with a collection of similar cases, enables
patterns of relevant facts to be quickly identified
and irrelevant ones to be filtered out. However,
practitioners’ schemata not only facilitated
pattern recognition, they also enabled a coherent
and efficient testing procedure for discriminating
among competing diagnoses in the decision-
making process. The experienced practitioner (NP
or GP) will know what factors can be left out of
the diagnostic equation, whereas those with less
experience may not know how to filter out inap-
propriate or redundant information. These cogni-
tive activities reflect exposure to a wide variety of
cases, thereby building up practical experience.
This needs to be supplemented with on-going
research-based evidence to underpin practice.
The relevance of both these areas of debate
(that is, whether an individual can consciously
and deliberately invoke schemata or whether their
use occurs automatically; and whether schema
functioning is simultaneous processing or whether
processing occurs sequentially) to the study find-
ings is that both groups of practitioners have
similar ‘cognitive architecture’ (Newell and
Simon, 1972). The ‘cognitive architecture’
explains the way knowledge is stored in human
memory and is referred to as the production rule,
having the form IF (situation) ! THEN (action)
(Newell and Simon, 1972; Reason, 1990). The
decision-making processes of both groups as
represented by their verbal protocols show
similarities. This means that the practitioners
have developed similar rules that govern their
skills. Some of these rules have been gained
through educational preparation and others have
been acquired through experience. Standardized
educational preparation and more widespread
understanding of the role of NPs would be
likely to encourage more GPs to fully utilize NPs’
skills.
The usefulness of information
processing theory in exploring
decision-making by nurse practitioners
Information processing theory was the framework
used in this research to investigate how the practi-
tioners actually think and reach decisions rather
than how they should make decisions. The theory
emphasizes understanding and explanation of
behaviour rather than prediction and control. In
using this theory, this study aimed to make a con-
tribution to the understanding and explanation of
NPs’ decision-making, rather than a contribution
to prediction. The use of verbal protocol analysis
derived from ‘think aloud’ procedures allowed
explanation to be made of the steps taken to solve
problems. The theory posits that hypotheses are
used to overcome the limitations of short-term
memory, and serve to narrow the size of the
problem space. The scope for possible inferences is
also narrowed and this in turn limits uncertainty.
The generation of hypotheses is a way of restruc-
turing the patient’s complaint from: ‘What is this
patient’s illness?’ to ‘Is the patient suffering from
A, B or C?’ (Joseph and Patel, 1990). The NPs and
GPs using this method concentrated on the cues
that were likely to produce an accurate diagnosis.
The ‘think aloud’ protocols provided rich data
that approximated to the concurrent reasoning
of the NPs and GPs, as well as showing the
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problem-solving moves in relation to their under-
pinning knowledge of the presenting problem.
Information Processing Theory (IPT) is influen-
tial in studies investigating nurses’ decision-mak-
ing, particularly since Elstein et al’s (1978)
seminal work on medical diagnostic decision-mak-
ing. The theory has been used to explore and
explain different aspects of nurse decision-making.
A large number of the studies used simulated
cases rather than real life clinical situations,
although the use of the former have been criti-
cized for their dissimilarity to the latter. Green-
wood (2000) provides three reasons for the
dissimilarity: the amount of information available
to the participant is controlled, information is
presented serially and the motivations and goals
of the participants are presumed to be singular
and simple. A counter argument to this view
relates to whether or not, from both the patient’s
and an ethical perspective, it is advisable to per-
mit ‘think aloud’ procedures during real clinical
situations. Greenwood’s (2000) views are rejected
in this study for the following reasons: (i) some
patients in the real clinical setting provide infor-
mation serially as well as in a controlled manner,
particularly if they are inarticulate. The skill of
obtaining the relevant verbal information lies
with the doctor or nurse, (ii) by complementing
the ‘think aloud’ process with questioning at the
end of the procedure, the motivations and goals
of the participants become explicit. The use of
the theory for this study is based on the prop-
osition that:
The protocol is a record of the subject’s
ongoing behaviour, and an utterance at
time t is taken to indicate knowledge or
operation at time t. Retrospective accounts
leave much more opportunity for the sub-
ject to mix current knowledge with past
knowledge, making reliable inferences from
the protocol difficult . . . All theorizing
about the causes and consequences of the
subject’s knowledge state is carried out and
validated by the experimenters, not by the
subject.
Newell and Simon, 1972: 184
In the absence of an educational benchmark for
NPs, the break down of these components in the
decision-making process is useful for understand-
ing the knowledge structures for the clinical prob-
lems they encounter. Understanding one’s errors
using this framework is a useful way to learn how
to correct faulty reasoning. IPT allows the diag-
nostic process to be explicit, aiding a systematic
way of teaching. A process that is understood can
be taught. The use of the framework along with
the demographic details of the practitioners
(Table 2), revealed that diagnostic performance
depended on clinical experience in a particular
domain or area of specialization. This consists of
several aspects: accumulated knowledge, skill in
data collection, skill in performing physical exam-
ination and skill in diagnostic reasoning. The
relative weights of each of these aspects in con-
tributing to the overall diagnostic performance
may differ according to the presenting problem
and may differ with each practitioner. The frame-
work was useful in highlighting the similarities in
knowledge structures of the participants’
responses, irrespective of whether they were right
or wrong. However, not surprisingly, NPs’
problem-solving skills tended to decrease in
unfamiliar areas possibly due to a restriction of
cases referred for consultation. The scenarios in
this study were ones deemed suitable for consul-
tation by either practitioner.
Conclusions
Expert knowledge in medicine, like nursing, is
highly complex and many different schemata are
used by experts to help organize and explain
patient data. The production of an appropriate
judgement and decision may come from a pattern
matching process against schema templates. This
process is a result of repeated experience with
patients, as well as from formal educational input.
Thus the solution of a patient problem is depen-
dent upon how the problem presents itself, and
the body of knowledge held by the practitioner.
Where commonalities exist between GPs and
NPs, it is argued that both groups attended to the
same salient points in the data. It seemed that
both groups had learned how to classify problems
with respect to the type of solution required: for
example, pattern matching, algorithms and infor-
mation processing methods. For some NPs, the
problems in their judgement and decision-making
seem to arise at the identification and elaboration
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knowledge stage of problem-solving because of a
lack of experience of, and exposure to, the con-
dition in question.
This study demonstrates that there is conver-
gent validity between the NPs and GPs who gave
correct responses to the scenarios. It concludes
that where NPs are given the opportunity to
undertake tasks that may be deemed suitable for
consultation by either practitioner, they are as
likely to achieve a correct diagnosis and offer
similar treatment as their GP counterpart. How-
ever, which cases might be deemed suitable for
NP consultation, currently remains the decision
of the individual GP.
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